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WHY PERSONHOOD MATTERS
Tamara R. Piety ∗
No aspect of the infamous 1 Citizens United 2 decision has
galvanized public opinion as much as the perception that in this
case the Supreme Court held that corporations are entitled to the
3
same rights as human beings. If the rallying cry of Citizens
4
United’s supporters is “Corporations are people, my friend,” that
5
of the opposition is “Free speech is for people.” Yet many
∗ Phyllis Hurley Frey Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; Senior
Research Scholar in Law, Yale Law School and Affiliated Fellow at the Information
Society Project at Yale Law School. I want to thank Free Speech for People and Harvard
Law School for sponsoring the conference and John Coates for inviting me to participate.
Thanks also to Constitutional Commentary, in particular Jill Hasday for supervising the
symposium, Tom Boyle for exceptional editing, and Heidi Kitrosser for comments and
feedback. Additional thanks to Ron Fein, Brandon Garrett, Kent Greenfield, Jennifer
Taub, and Gerald Torres for feedback, David Ciepley and Turkuler Isiksel for allowing
me to quote from their works-in-progress and to my research assistant, LaShunta Williams,
for her excellent assistance.
1. One writer has described Citizens United as “remarkably unpopular.” Emily
Bazelon, Marriage of Convenience, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2015, Magazine, at 13, 14.
Disapproval of Citizens United is also bipartisan. Linda Greenhouse, Missing the Tea Party,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010 (describing Citizens United as “widely disliked” “across the
ideological spectrum”).
2. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3. As discussed below, there is a sense in which this is mistaken. Nevertheless, this
impression is widespread and is by no means confined to the general public. For example,
one academic observer characterized the opinion as “concluding that corporate speech
should be treated the same as individual speech.” Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A
Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61
CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 497, 498 (2010). Another writer who is both an academic and
an esteemed jurist writes that the conservatives on the Supreme Court “have equated the
for-profit corporation with flesh-and-blood Americans entitled to cast a vote.” Leo E.
Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between
Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 390
(2015).
4. Philip Rucker, Mitt Romney Says, “Corporations Are People,” WASH. POST
(Aug. 11, 2011).
5. The name of one of the sponsors of this conference is Free Speech for People,
Freespeechforpeople.org, but there are also other organizations and persons similarly
lobbying and organizing around the proposition that this aspect of Citizens United needs
to be overturned, often by constitutional amendment. See, e.g., Movetoamend.org/otheramendments (collecting examples of proposed constitutional amendments in reaction to
Citizens United).
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knowledgeable commenters, including many legal scholars, 6 tell
us that this public perception is mistaken. Corporate personhood
is not the problem, they say. Nothing turns on the legal fiction of
corporate personhood. So efforts to amend the Constitution, or to
otherwise “overturn” Citizens United are misguided, even
7
mischievous, because the personhood fiction is a “useful fiction,”
8
one necessary to accomplish all sorts of worthy objectives,
objectives which would be undermined if we did away with
9
corporate personhood.
In this Essay I want to reject the suggestion that personhood
is not important. Although it is true that corporate personhood
10
has been around long before Citizens United, the public’s
6. Including some participants of this symposium. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Let Us
Now Praise Corporate Persons, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan./Feb. 2015); Kent Greenfield, Why
Progressives Should Oppose a Constitutional Amendment to End Corporate ‘Personhood,’
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2012, 5:22 PM). Other law professors weighing in on the same
theme include: Stephen Bainbridge, The Moronic Campaign Against Corporate
Personhood, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Nov. 5, 2011, 6:58 PM); Garrett Epps, Don’t
Blame “Corporate Personhood,” THE AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 16, 2012); Brandon Garrett,
The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95 (2014); Eric Posner,
Stop Fussing Over Personhood, SLATE (Dec. 11, 2013, 10:09 AM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/12/personhood_for_corporations_an
d_chimpanzees_is_an_essential_legal_fiction.html;
Adam
Winkler,
Corporate
Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE L. REV. 863 (2007). See also
Eric Williamson, In the Wake of Wall Street Protests, Professors Illuminate ‘Corporate
Personhood,’ UVA LAWYER (Fall 2011), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/alumni/
uvalawyer/f11/personhood.htm (collecting observations from various professors, none of
whom suggest that corporate personhood is determinative). Non-academics have made
similar arguments, sometimes in academic journals. See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro & Caitlyn W.
McCarthy, So What if Corporations Aren’t People?, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 701 (2011)
[hereinafter So What?]. The personhood issue arose again in Hobby Lobby and once again
some observers suggested that corporate personhood is not the important issue. See, e.g.,
Matthew Yglesias, 5 Mistakes Liberals Make About Corporate Personhood and Hobby
Lobby, VOX (July 1, 2014, 11:50AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/7/1/5860742/5-mistakesliberals-make-about-corporate-personhood-and-hobby-lobby.
7. Shapiro & McCarthy, So What?, supra note 6, at 708.
8. See, e.g., Greenfield, Let Us Now Praise Corporate Persons, supra note 6;
Greenfield, Why Progressives Should Oppose a Constitutional Amendment to End
Corporate ‘Personhood,’ supra note 6; Shapiro & McCarthy, So What?, supra note 6, at
708–10.
9. See, e.g., Epps, supra note 6; Shapiro & McCarthy, So What?, supra note 6;
Posner, supra note 6; Bainbridge, supra note 6; Greenfield, Let Us Now Praise Corporate
Persons, supra note 6.
10. Corporations have been juridical “persons” for some purposes since at least the
nineteenth century and perhaps longer. See supra note 6. Many have remarked on this fact
in reports on the case. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, In Arguments on Corporate Speech, the Press
Is a Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2011, at A12 (noting that corporate personhood is an
“old and established rule”). However, as many scholars, lawyers and judges have observed,
the extension of constitutional rights to business corporations was undertaken “without
exposition or explanation.” William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735,
737 (1949).
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perception that the Court did something important with the
concept is correct and we are continuing to see the consequences
of that interpretation unfold in cases like Hobby Lobby. What the
Court did was to cast the corporation into the role of a
“disfavored” speaker. It suggested that the campaign finance
limitations were discriminatory because they only applied to
corporations and that such “discrimination” was unconstitutional.
This rhetorical move has been repeated in subsequent cases
11
substituting “marketing” for “corporation” and “free exercise of
12
13
religion” for “freedom of expression.” This framing exploits
our tendency to condemn discrimination between persons in
order to make these controversial decisions seem self-evidently
14
correct and neutral. The personhood metaphor distracts from
the underlying, theoretical vacuum. The Court has never said that
15
corporations enjoy all of the same rights as persons. But it hasn’t
11. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (declaring statute which singles
out “marketing” for regulation unconstitutional).
12. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Religious Freedom
Restoration Act [RFRA] covers for-profit corporations and offers corporations a basis for
requesting exemption from some aspects of the Affordable Care Act’s mandate that
employers cover some birth control which the plaintiffs objected to providing).
13. It is important to note that although Citizens United and Sorrell were decided on
explicitly constitutional grounds, Hobby Lobby was not. Ostensibly, the Court was merely
interpreting RFRA; but the interpretative move is the same and seemingly
indistinguishable from the process by which the Court would find a constitutional free
exercise right, since it seems, as a preliminary matter, one needs to be able to have a
religious belief and seek to practice it for RFRA to be applicable.
14. See, e.g., Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Persons and Personhood,
LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Jan. 11, 2015), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/
2004/03/legal_theory_le_2.html (“[T]he claim that corporations are moral persons would
be controversial.”).
15. Garrett, supra note 6, at 97–98 (noting that corporations cannot vote, are not
“citizens” under the Fourteenth Amendment, do not enjoy the protection of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, rights against self-incrimination, or Due Process Clause liberty
rights). The explanation for when a corporation should enjoy the same rights as human
beings and when it should not is generally described as undertheorized. Professor Garrett
attempts to address this gap by proposing a theory that derives from the requirements of
Article III standing. This theory is certainly plausible and I find it attractive in many
respects. It is a masterful effort, but it nevertheless runs up against one of the usual
problems of such a unifying project; there are some cases that don’t fit. For example, he
finds Hobby Lobby departs from his schema rather dramatically. Id. at 102–03. Moreover,
to some extent, if what we want to know is when, and on what basis, the Supreme Court
will extend constitutional rights to corporations, he assumes the question when he writes
“some constitutional rights are individual-centered and not plausible as rights of
corporations.” Id. at 98. Thus, he finds it “unsurprising” that the Court has not recognized
a corporate right to “serve on juries, run for public office, marry, procreate, or travel.” Id.
at 98. But I daresay that until the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, most observers might
well have included a First Amendment right of free exercise of religion in this list. The fact
that the Court is drawing the line in a particular place today provides only limited
reassurance about where it will draw it tomorrow. See Winkler, supra note 6, at 869
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offered much explanation for the distinctions. As many scholars
have observed the Supreme Court has failed to articulate a theory
for corporate rights, relying instead on what could (at best) be
16
described as “case-by-case adjudication” and (at worst) as
17
something less charitable. What we have instead of a rationale is
an ipse dixit. “[R]emarkably, the Court has never offered a
sustained argument as to why corporations merit constitutional
rights. . . . strictly speaking, the question has never been decided
18
but merely presumed decided.” There is a blank spot where a
rationale should be.
It is worth contemplating this empty spot. Although we
condemn discrimination between persons as invidious, there is a
sense that we do so based upon a recognition of our shared
humanity and that human beings exist whether the law recognizes
them or not, but that for law to have a claim to moral legitimacy
19
it must recognize them. However, there is no such prior
existence of corporations. A corporation is a legal fiction. It has
(pointing to Austin and McConnell, cases overruled by Citizens United, as proving that it
is “easy to exaggerate the importance of Bellotti” [Bellotti is the case the Supreme Court
relied on in Citizens United to overturn those cases.]).
16. Shapiro & McCarthy, So What?, supra note 6, at 705.
17. See Garrett, supra note 6, at 99 (reviewing criticisms).
18. David Ciepley, Neither Persons nor Associations: Against Constitutional Rights
for Corporations, 1 J.L. & CTS. 221, 223–24 (2013). This analytical vacuum dates back at
least to the infamous Santa Clara case in which the Supreme Court assumed that a
corporation was a person for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Santa Clara Cnty.
v. S. Pac. Railway Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). The “holding” did not even appear in the case,
but only in the headnotes prepared by the reporter. “For such a momentous decision, the
opinion in the Santa Clara case is disquietingly brief—just one short paragraph—and
totally without reasons or precedent.” Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The
Development of the Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 173 (1985) (emphasis
added). See also Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have Employed
Bogus Jurisprudence to Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals,
28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523 (2009). Apparently, the groundwork had been laid for this
conclusion three years earlier, in a similar case where the lawyer arguing for the railroad
was involved in the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus spoke from a position
of some authority as to what the drafters of the Amendment intended. For a fascinating
discussion of the alleged “conspiracy” to give corporations rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Howard Jay Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938), Howard Jay Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory” of
the Fourteenth Amendment: 2, 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938). For additional insight into this
series, see Mark DeWolfe Howe, A Footnote to the “Conspiracy Theory,” 48 YALE L.J.
1007 (1938). For additional observations about the absence of support for the decision see
Douglas, supra note 10.
19. I touch here on a question which itself is the subject of much jurisprudential and
philosophical debate as to which living creatures (animals) or organisms (fetuses), merit
legal status as persons, a debate which I cannot even begin to address, let alone resolve, in
this limited space. Suffice it to say that we do not need to resolve this question to observe
that corporations are not living things.
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the attributes the law gives it, no more, no less. 20 There does not
seem to be any good reason that the entity, as such, needs
protection for freedom of expression or freedom to exercise a
religion. Nor does it seem that there should be any philosophical,
moral or political necessity for a commitment to the equal
treatment of all fictional entities. Quite the reverse; such a
commitment would make it more difficult to tax various entities
differently or to regulate some industries more heavily than
21
others. This is the sort of regulation that the end of the Lochner
22
era appeared to settle.
Yet hostility to such distinctions is what Citizens United and
its progeny reflect. This hostility seems based on eliding the moral
statuses of the juridical versus the human “person” and that
23
elision facilitates a broadly deregulatory agenda, one that lays
the foundation for attacking securities laws, labeling and
disclosure laws, licensing laws, pharmaceutical marketing
24
regulation, truth-in-lending laws, and countless others.
This effect is reflected in some of the arguments made in the
trial courts and the decisions emerging from them. Challenges to
all manner of regulations, from a law requiring a license for
25
dealers in precious metals, to the FDA’s new graphic warning

20. See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35
YALE L.J. 655, 655 (1926). This Essay is not an inquiry into the “essence” of a corporation;
quite the reverse. I mean to highlight that a corporation is legal construct. See Joanna M.
Meyer, The Real Error in Citizens United, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2171, 2182–86 (2012)
(describing inquiries into the corporate essence as circular). The critique of the legal
treatment of corporations as persons is one of longstanding. See, e.g., Carl J. Mayer,
Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 577
(1990); Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV.
643 (1932).
21. Compare I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) to I.R.C. § 527.
22. Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U.
ILL. L. REV. 485 (2012). Of course, this may be an example of simply expressing
disapproval. See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and
Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 682–84 (2005) (describing Lochner’s status
as for many years part of the “anti-canon” but gradually losing that status in recent years).
23. Tamara R. Piety, Citizens United and the Threat to the Regulatory State, 109
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16 (2010).
24. See, e.g., Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128
HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2015) (discussing Edwards v. District of Columbia and how the new
free speech jurisprudence seems to open the way to reevaluation of regulatory power
thought to be settled since Lochner); Edwards v. Dist. of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (invalidating, on First Amendment grounds, licensing requirement for D.C. tour
guides).
25. Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682 (6th Cir. 2014) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to state licensing requirement for dealers in precious metals).
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labels on cigarettes, 26 from whether an employer has to post
27
notices concerning what the law is regarding a union, to whether
28
country-of-origin labeling regulations are constitutional, and
29
from a law setting a minimum wage, to a proposal for a law
providing that only “environmentally responsible” companies
30
receive special tax treatment. In short, there is almost no case
that can’t, with creative lawyering, be turned into a First
Amendment case and many of these cases depend upon some
31
version of the equal protection argument. Plaintiffs have won
some and lost some, but the Supreme Court’s continued
adherence to this interpretive strategy suggests that, for the
foreseeable future, businesses will win more than they lose
because the personhood metaphor seems to compel courts to
reject “discrimination” against corporations.

26. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
27. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
28. Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d at 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
29. Order on Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., Int’l Franchise Assoc., Inc. v. City of Seattle,
Case No 2:14-CV-00848-RAJ. For a summary of the case and supporting briefs from the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, see http://www.chamberlitigation.com/internationalfranchise-association-inc-et-al-v-city-seattle (raising equal protection challenge to Seattle
law raising minimum wage for fast food workers which excluded franchisees from small
business exception).
30. Memorandum & Order on Request for Preliminary Injunction, Mary Elin Noel
v. Bd of Elec. Comm’rs, No. 1422-CC00249 (May 27, 2014). For more on this case,
including a link to the final order, see Lindsay van Dyke, Statement Regarding Court
Decision in Noel v. Board of Commissioners, FREESPEECHFORPEOPLE.ORG (May 28,
2014), available at http://www.freespeechforpeople.org/node/684 (raising equal
protection argument to ballot proposal for law to deny tax breaks to unsustainable
energy producers).
31. See, e.g., POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC, 777 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(upholding in part and invalidating in part FTC order forbidding POM Wonderful’s
unsubstantiated claims of a health benefit from drinking pomegranate juice against a
First Amendment challenge); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(striking down SEC disclosure rule on “conflict minerals” required by Dodd-Frank as
violating the First Amendment); Law School Admission Council v. State, 222 Cal. App.
4th 1265 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding that a law prohibiting LSAC from flagging students
who took the LSAT with accommodations and requiring that all scores be reported in
the same way did not violate LSAC’s “fundamental rights” to freedom of speech,
protection against compelled speech, and equal protection).
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Personhood matters. 32 It “tilts” the outcomes. 33 Part I of this
Essay reviews the arguments offered for why we shouldn’t care
about corporate personhood and finds them unconvincing. Part II
then focuses on why the personhood metaphor does matter. The
chorus of voices insisting that personhood doesn’t matter is bit
like the Wizard of Oz: “Pay no attention to the man behind the
curtain!” Dorothy is told. But it is only by looking behind the
curtain that we can see the levers in action.
I.

PAY NO ATTENTION TO CORPORATE
PERSONHOOD

A. “EVERYBODY KNOWS CORPORATIONS AREN’T PEOPLE!”
The first line of attack on the significance of corporate
personhood is a dismissive reassurance that the public is wrong in
thinking that in Citizens United the Supreme Court granted
corporations the same First Amendment rights as human beings.
I encountered this reaction first hand.
In 2014, at the University of Tulsa, I had the pleasure of
participating in a Federalist Society debate about corporate
personhood. There, Ilya Shapiro of the Cato Institute told the
assembled students that “of course” everyone knows that
corporations are “not real people!” His tone implied that all of
this uproar about corporate personhood is a tempest in a teapot.
This talk echoed the same point he had made in an earlier article:
“It is a misconception that the concept of ‘corporate personhood’
has played a central role in shaping corporate speech rights in
American jurisprudence. No court has ever said that corporations
34
35
are ‘real’ people.”
32. Many others legal observers believe likewise, but one of the earliest, strongest,
most persistent, and most prescient voices has been Professor Daniel Greenwood. See, e.g.,
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech is Not Free, 83 IOWA L.
REV. 309 (1997); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Should Corporations Have First Amendment
Rights?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 875 (2007); Daniel Greenwood, FCC v. AT&T:
Impersonal Privacy and the Idolatry of Corporations, 2011 HARV. L & POL’Y REV. ONLINE
(2011). Professor Greenwood’s work has deeply influenced my own views.
33. In his famous Santa Clara article, Professor Horwitz argued that certain legal
formulations can “have ‘tilt’ or influence in determining outcomes.” Horwitz, supra note
18, at 176.
34. Note how much of the work is being done with this word “real.” To what does
“real” refer?
35. Shapiro & McCarthy, So What, supra note 6, at 703 (citing Winkler, supra note 6,
at 863). It is curious that Shapiro & McCarthy would rely on this passage. Professor
Winkler published that article in 2007, before Citizens United was decided. The relevant
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Many legal academics identified as conservatives 36 have
similarly weighed in to assure us that the corporate personhood
issue is simply no problem at all. Eric Posner tell us to “stop
37
fussing over personhood” and Steven Bainbridge describes the
38
campaign against corporate personhood as “moronic.” They
suggest that the public’s impression that personhood was an
important feature of Citizens United simply reflects a lack of legal
39
sophistication.
But this attitude is not confined to conservatives. Many
40
identified with the left also take (or have taken) this position.
Thus, Garrett Epps tells us not to “blame” corporate personhood
41
for the outcome in Citizens United and Kent Greenfield, a
participant in this symposium, argues that corporate personhood
42
is a “red herring” which obscures more important issues. Indeed,
43
Greenfield believes progressives should embrace corporate

passage is the following: “[T]he notion of corporate personhood—has not played the
central role in shaping corporate speech rights that some believe. Corporations have free
speech rights, but they are more limited than those held by individuals.” Id. (emphasis
added). The cases Winkler cited for the proposition that corporations’ speech rights were
more limited than those of human beings, Austin and McConnell, Winkler, supra note 6,
at 870, were the very ones Citizens United overruled. So this passage would not seem to be
a particularly reassuring basis for concluding that the distinction remained.
36. Labels like “liberal” and “conservative” are often unhelpful, but they are
particularly unhelpful in the First Amendment context. In contrast to the days when Chief
Justice Rehnquist, a noted conservative, was a commercial and corporate speech skeptic,
today it seems most conservatives support robust protection for both. See Tamara R. Piety,
“A Necessary Cost of Freedom”?: The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1,
32, 45–47 (2012).
37. Posner, supra note 6.
38. Bainbridge, supra note 6.
39. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. This suggestion overlooks the fact
that many legal scholars have gotten the same impression, including some corporate law
scholars. For example, Chief Justice Leo Strine, Jr., of the Delaware Supreme Court, and
his co-author Nicholas Walter write that the Supreme Court has “equated the for-profit
corporation with flesh-and-blood Americans entitled to cast a vote.” Strine & Walter,
supra note 3, at 390.
40. It is possible that some may have changed their minds.
41. Epps, supra note 6.
42. Greenfield, Why Progressives Should Oppose a Constitutional Amendment to
End Corporate ‘Personhood,’ supra note 6.
43. I share some of Professor Bainbridge’s reservations about the word
“progressive.” See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
856, 857 n.1 (1997). But I also can’t think of a good alternative. See also David Yosifon,
The Citizens United Gambit in Corporate Theory: A Reply to Bainbridge on Strine and
Walter, Santa Clara University Law School Working Paper No. 4-14, at 3–4 (Oct. 2014)
(calling for clarity in terminology).
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personhood as a path toward corporate social responsibility. 44 The
overall message is that those who think corporate personhood is
a significant issue either lack legal training or are unsophisticated,
45
“naïve metaphysicians.”
If, as Shapiro argues, “everyone” knows that corporations
should not have the same rights as natural persons, it is not clear
who he means by that “everyone.” Many legal academics do seem
to believe that in Citizens United the Court did something very
like treating corporations as if they were entitled to all the rights
46
of natural persons.
Certainly, many corporate litigants have enthusiastically
pressed the claim that corporations ought to have the same rights
47
as human beings. They have not always been successful, but the
44. Greenfield, Let Us Now Praise Corporate Personhood, supra note 6. See also
Lyman Johnson & David K. Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1
(2015) (same). Others believe Citizens United makes CSR reforms more plausible. See
Strine & Walter, supra note 3, at 379–90.
45. John Carney on Corporate Personhood and the Incoherent Argument Against It,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (June 30, 2014, 8:45 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge
.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/06/john-carney-on-corporate-personhood-and-theincoherent-argument-against-it.html (Those who are concerned about corporate
personhood are “naïve metaphysicians.”). (It is not clear from Bainbridge’s post which
“John Carney” he is referring to, but it may be the Carney who reports on Wall Street for
CNBC.) Interestingly, Carney seems to claim something Shapiro and others do not, that it
would be incoherent to make distinctions between corporations and other types of persons.
Id.
46. Strine & Walter, supra note 3; Michael Kagan, Speaker Discrimination: The Next
Frontier of Free Speech (2015) UNLV School of Law Scholarly Works. Paper 901; see, e.g.,
Tucker, supra note 3.
47. For example, post-Citizens United, AT&T argued that the company ought to
enjoy a personal privacy right under the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA] in order to
prevent public disclosure of some internal emails and memoranda, materials which it had
turned over to the government pursuant to an investigation and which were the subject of
a FOIA request. “For at least 140 years,” AT&T argued, “it has been ‘well understood that
corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional
and statutory analysis.’” FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (Respondent’s Brief at 9). Given
that the FOIA statute’s reference to “persons” had been interpreted to include
corporations, AT&T argued that the word “personal” in the statute should likewise be
interpreted to “refer[] to both individuals and corporations, because the noun from which
it is formed also includes both individuals and corporations.” Id. Lyle Denniston, writing
for SCOTUS blog, saw this argument as raising the corporate personhood issue “again,”
apparently reflecting that he also found the personhood issue significant. Lyle Denniston,
Argument Preview: Corporate “Personhood”—Again, SCOTUSblog, (Jan. 18, 2011, 11:02
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/argument-preview-corporate-personhoodagain. Perhaps surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not agree. It unanimously rejected
AT&T’s argument. The vote was 8-0. Kagan recused herself, presumably because she was
the Solicitor General when the case began. FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1180. In an
opinion eerily similar to Hobby Lobby (Part III of Opinion of the Court), but coming to
the opposite result, the Supreme Court found the FOIA exception an easy case against
AT&T. The contrast between the AT&T and Hobby Lobby highlights a point made below,
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arguments have been made. Some legal academics have likewise
argued that corporations should receive the same First
48
Amendment protection as natural persons. Professor Michael
Kagan has argued that Citizens United and its progeny opened up
49
a new “speaker discrimination” jurisprudence. And obviously
the general public is clearly not a part of this “everyone” who
knows that legal personhood does not mean equal treatment with
human beings. Rather, as discussed above, personhood seems to
be precisely what has galvanized public opposition to the case.
It is true, however, that the Supreme Court continues to
adhere to the proposition that corporations do not have the full
50
panoply of rights that natural persons do; but, as will be
discussed further below, the case law does not inspire confidence
about how the Court will rule on any particular question in the
future.
B. “. . .A USEFUL FICTION. . .”
Somewhat paradoxically, many of those who argue that
corporate personhood is “just” a fiction and therefore we
shouldn’t get too worked up about it, nevertheless also argue that
corporate personhood is critical to the proper functioning of the
legal system and to the economy. Doing away with this fiction
through a constitutional amendment, such as that proposed by
51
52
Free Speech for People or Move to Amend, would, they warn
darkly, wreak havoc with corporate law and on civil society.
For example, Professor Bainbridge notes that “[a]lthough the
corporation’s legal personality obviously is a fiction, it is a very
53
useful one.” Without this fiction, he writes, the corporation
that the Court has failed to offer a theory which would explain why it reaches the results it
does in one case versus another. One wonders, given the proximity of Citizens United and
the backlash it engendered, if in AT&T the Court intended to reassure the public that it
would not give corporations all the same rights as natural persons. For a theory that this
sort of calculation may sometimes take place in the crafting of opinions, see Bazelon, supra
note 1.
48. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right
That Big Corporations Should Have But Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 639
(2011); Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109 (1992).
49. Kagan, supra note 46.
50. See Garrett, supra note 6, at 98.
51. The People’s Rights Amendment, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, http://www.
freespeechforpeople.org/node/527 (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
52. Other Amendments, MOVE TO AMEND (Nov. 5, 2014), available at www.move
toamend.org/other-amendments.
53. Bainbridge, supra note 6.
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would not be able to own land, contract, sue and be sued. 54
Moreover, the freedom of advocacy organizations to participate
in political speech or of newspapers and blogs to publish would be
55
at an end since they too are corporations.
But it is not at clear why this should be so. With all due
respect to Bainbridge, other corporate law scholars have observed
that corporate “legal personality” “is not in itself an attribute that
is a necessary precondition for the existence of anyor indeed
allof these rules [limited liability of shareholders for corporate
wrongs or debts, shelter of corporate assets from shareholders’
personal creditors, and authority to enter into contracts and the
like], but merely a handy label for a package that conveniently
56
bundles them together.”
Convenience should not be confused with necessity.
Presumably a different label could be used to accomplish many of
these functions. Indeed, with respect to ownership of land, there
is some evidence that organizations have been able to hold
property in the name of the organization, even when
57
unincorporated. That suggests that juridical personhood may not
be essential to accomplish some of the functions said to be
desirable attributes of corporate personhood.
“Personhood” is not a description of reality, it is metaphor
for the functions. Moreover, using this metaphor as a placeholder
for the rights which have been arrogated to the corporation
should not be confused with conferring on the corporation the
qualities of the thing from which the metaphor is drawn. As one
respected corporate law scholar puts it: “[A]lthough it is common
in the legal literature to extend syllogistic deduction from the
premise of legal personality to the existence of characteristics
beyond the three foundational features [of corporations] . . . no
58
functional rationale . . . compels this.”
Other authors not only do not find that corporate
personhood compels us to treat a corporate person as possessing
54. Id. See also Posner, supra note 6.
55. This is a concern which Greenfield also focuses on. See Greenfield, Let Us Now
Praise Corporate Persons, supra note 6. See also Nick Bentley, Surprise! Citizens United
Legal Reasoning Doesn’t Rely on Corporate Personhood, RECLAIM DEMOCRACY (Nov.
11, 2012), http://reclaimdemocracy.org/citizens-united-corporate-personhood/.
56. REINIER KRAAKMAN, ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 9 (2d ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
57. Richard R. B. Powell, Land Capacity of Natural Persons as Unincorporated
Groups, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 297 (1949).
58. KRAAKMAN, ET AL., supra note 56, at 9.
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the same rights as human beings, they warn that “reification is a
device for making something that is in fact complex seem simple,
59
and that can be dangerous.”
Other countries, some with vastly differing political regimes,
provide roughly the same benefits for business entities without
60
using the fiction of the corporate person. So why would doing
away with corporate personhood prevent legislatures from
coming up with some other label to accomplish some of these
same goals which are not so controversial, such as holding
property or being sued, without dragging along either the
constitutional or the rhetorical baggage of “personhood”? To be
sure, such a change could involve rewriting or reinterpreting a
great deal of law. But the Supreme Court seems to have already
put us on that path. And given the hurdles inherent in the
61
amendment process, if a constitutional amendment succeeds,
“inconvenience” doesn’t make for a very compelling objection.
C. PROTECTING THE “REAL” PEOPLE
These first two observations are, however, but warm-ups;
there are two more substantive arguments used to steer us away
from attributing significance to legal personhood. The first of
these is the argument that what the Supreme Court recognized in
Citizens United (and perhaps even more explicitly in Hobby
Lobby) was the interests of the real human beings who stood
behind the corporation. “A corporation is simply a form of
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. . . .
When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to
62
corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.”
For example, although Shapiro and McCarthy acknowledge
that a corporation is not a real person, they propose, as an idea
“on which most people of all ideologies and jurisprudential
59. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 118 (11th ed. 2010).

FINANCE: LEGAL

60. Teemu Ruskola, What is a Corporation? Liberal, Confucian, and Socialist
Theories of Enterprise Organization (and State, Family, and Personhood), 37 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 639 (2014). It is also worth mentioning that investor-state tribunals have extended
international human rights guarantees to corporate claimants. See Turkuler Isiksel, The
Rights of Man and the Rights of the Man-Made: Corporations and Human Rights
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
61. See, e.g., Heather Gerken, The Right to Vote: Is the Amendment Game Worth the
Candle?, 23 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 11 (2014) (expressing skepticism about the wisdom
of pursuing a constitutional amendment to provide an affirmative right to vote).
62. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
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backgrounds can agree,” 63 that “the individuals who make up
those corporations—officers, directors, employees, shareholders—
64
are” actually people and therefore, “[i]t would be a mistake to
deny constitutional rights to those individuals on the grounds that
65
a corporation itself is not a real person.” In what is presumably
an intentional attempt to draw parallels to the language in another
66
famous First Amendment case, Shapiro and McCarthy write that
these individuals “do not shed their own constitutional rights at
67
the office-building door.”
Actually, most employees, even most public employees, do
surrender their freedom of expression, even their freedom of
political expression, maybe especially political expression, at the
68
workplace door. And it is ironic in the extreme to see defenders
of these decisions sweeping “employees” into the ambit of the
corporation in order to justify giving the corporation the right to
deprive employees of a benefit that the law is intended to provide
to them! But it also conflates denying the corporation rights with
denying rights to the human beings:
63. Shapiro & McCarthy, So What?, supra note 6, at 707.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
67. Shapiro & McCarthy, So What?, supra note 6, at 707. An employer’s suppression
of speech is usually not precluded by the First Amendment unless the government is the
employer, and sometimes not even then. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). For an
extended discussion of this issue which is still relevant, see Richard Michael Fischl, Labor,
Management, and the First Amendment: Whose Rights Are These, Anyway?, 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 729 (1989). See also Alina Tugend, Speaking Freely About Politics Can Cost You
Your Job, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2015, at B4.
68. One response to this observation is that the First Amendment is a negative liberty
with application only against the government, not private parties. (“Congress shall make
no law. . . .”) When a private employer fires you because of your bumper sticker there is
no “state action” to which the First Amendment would apply. However, this interpretation
overlooks the government’s role in allocating private rights by either providing or denying
a right of action, an insight which traces back to Wesley Hohfeld, see Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J.
710 (1917) (discussing courts’ tendencies to elide the right/privilege distinction and to
create duties in situations where there ought to be, at best, what Hohfeld described as a
“no right”), and the fact that one of the landmark First Amendment cases, newly beloved
by corporate and commercial speech’s defenders, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), is an example of a case where the Court found the necessary state action,
and thus offense to the First Amendment, in a state’s allowing a private cause of action for
defamation. See Mark Tushnet, Introduction: Reflections on the First Amendment and the
Information Economy, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2234, 2253 (2014) (“It [New York Times v.
Sullivan] should be found in two places in standard constitutional law casebooks, once in
the section on the First Amendment and once in the section on the state action doctrine.”).
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[O]bviously an association of people cannot have all the same
rights as the individuals who make it up, such as the right to
vote . . . , but the question “Which rights does it derive from its
individuals?” cannot be answered with ““The same rights its
69
individuals are entitled to.”

This is a circular inquiry.
It does not follow from the proposition that Hobby Lobby as
an entity does not have free exercise rights that its owners, the
Greens, do not. The Greens’ rights, as individuals, to practice
their religion would have been unimpaired had the Court ruled
the other way. The problem is, does that free exercise involve
using a corporation in particular ways? What the Greens were
arguing for can hardly have been described as a time-honored use
of the for-profit corporate form or it would have been an easy case
in Hobby Lobby’s favor. But it was not. Despite Justice Alito’s
70
contortions to show otherwise, the case law is threadbare.
Perhaps the most significant problem with this “look to the
people behind the corporation” argument is that it is in some
tension with corporate law. One of the purposes of the formal,
separate entity in corporate law is precisely to permit courts to
71
disregard those human beings behind the corporate form. This
separate entity status is tied up with limited liability, a feature
which makes the corporate form so attractive to investors and
which, it is said, to be so critical to a dynamic and democratic form

69. Meyer, supra note 20, at 2217–18.
70. The opinion relies heavily on Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), the case
of Orthodox Jewish merchants who objected to Sunday closing laws. Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767–70 (2014). However, the merchants in that case
were not corporations. If the issue had actually been well settled, presumably Hobby
Lobby would have been less controversial. The proliferation of articles in the academic
literature suggests that the issue of whether for-profit corporations were covered by RFRA
was far from well settled. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby,
Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA
Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014) (arguing that RFRA covers corporations);
Spencer Churchill, Comment, Whose Religion Matters in Corporate RFRA Claims After
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)?, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
437 (2014) (arguing that the Hobby Lobby decision protects the rights of persons beyond
owners of the firm);
71. The idea of a separate corporate entity is part of the justification for the limited
liability of shareholders for corporate debts. Reaching shareholders requires “piercing the
corporate veil.” Piercing and reverse piercing is the subject of much scholarly debate. It is
often trenchantly criticized. Stephen Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L.
479 (2001). For an argument that veil-piercing case law is more coherent than it appears,
see Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real
Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99 (2014).
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of capitalism 72 and, at least in large, publicly traded companies,
73
economic efficiency.
Of course, as Steven Bainbridge has argued, corporate law
also provides for “piercing” and “reverse piercing” of “the
74
corporate veil.” Piercing the corporate veil allows the
corporation’s creditors to reach the assets of the shareholders and
reverse piercing allows the shareholders’ creditors to reach the
assets of the corporation in which the debtor may have an
ownership interest. Piercing involves disregarding “the
75
corporation’s separate legal personality.” And like the question
of when corporations have constitutional rights, there is little
clarity around the question of when the corporate veil may be
pierced. Lawyers and judges have long bemoaned the chaotic
76
nature of the case law on piercing.
Still, the Hobby Lobby case could have been decided with
resort to this body of law. Professor Bainbridge helpfully offered
a roadmap to the Court for how it might decide in Hobby Lobby’s
77
favor through the application of the piercing doctrine. If the
Court had followed that roadmap, the invocation to “the persons
behind” the corporation might make more sense, even if one
thought Hobby Lobby did not present an appropriate case for
such such piecing. But the Court did not appear to be inclined to
78
follow Professor Bainbridge’s suggestions.
72. See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited
Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148 (1992).
73. JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 259–60 (7th ed. 2010)
(quoting FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW, 41–44 (1991)).
74. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise
Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 GREEN BAG 235 (2013).
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1037–38 (1991) (describing the dissatisfaction in the legal
community with the lack of coherence in the doctrine).
77. Bainbridge, supra note 74.
78. This may be why Alito didn’t cite him. See Stephen Bainbridge, Glad Hobby
Lobby Won But Wish Alito Had Cited Me!, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (June 30, 2014,
8:12 AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/06/gladhobby-lobby-won-but-wish-alito-had-cited-me.html. It would have been a more defensible
opinion if Alito had followed Bainbridge’s blueprint. As Bainbridge himself is at pains to
point out, the Court doesn’t even define what constitutes a “closely held” corporation for
purposes of this opinion, (assuming we confine its application to its facts). See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, What Is a “Close Corporation” for Purposes of the New Hobby Lobby Rule?,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 1, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.professorbain
bridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/07/what-is-a-close-corporation-for-purposesof-the-new-hobby-lobby-rule.html. But it seems, in Bainbridge’s view, not to be limited to
closely held corporations as statutorily defined by various states’ laws. I fear Bainbridge’s
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In fact, despite littering the opinion with lots of references to
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga as “closely held” corporations,
thereby suggesting that their closely held status was germane to
the decision, Justice Alito rather pointedly rejected the
proposition that the Court’s decision was dependent upon Hobby
79
Lobby’s status as a closely held corporation. “No known
understanding of the term ‘person’ includes some but not all
80
corporations,” he wrote. And he dismissed concerns about the
application of the Court’s holding to large, publicly traded
companies by observing that it “seems unlikely” that these sorts
81
of “corporate giants” would “often assert RFRA claims.” That
is not the same thing as saying that they cannot do so.
Finally, the observation that a corporation is made up of
people and lumping together of all the various people associated
with a corporation, including employees, without any discussion
of how one chooses which of these groups’ “speech” the
corporation’s speech reflects, simply engenders a new problem.
As many corporate law scholars are at pains to point out,
shareholders in a corporation are not normal “owners” and thus
enjoy almost none of the ordinary benefits of ownership. Rather
they have extremely limited rights of control of the corporation in
82
general and none over its speech. The exercise of these rights are
so thoroughly controlled by the corporation’s management that it

skepticism about the Supreme Court’s “institutional competence in areas of corporate
law” may be justified. See also Ellen Aprill, Hobby Lobby and the Tax Definition of Closely
Held Corporation, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 16, 2014), http://www. theconglom
erate.org/2014/07/hobby-lobby-and-the-tax-definition-of-closely-held-corporation.html.
79. In fact, as noted above, more than one commentator has pointed out that the
opinion is vague about what it means by “closely held” and that this limitation (if it even
exists, which I don’t think it does) is problematic for a number of reasons. See supra note
78.
80. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014) (emphasis
added). Note too that this quote rather decisively negates the proposition that the holding
in Hobby Lobby was in fact “limited” to closely held corporations as was so widely
reported. See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Hobby Lobby Ruling, A Missing
Definition Stirs Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2014, at B7.
81. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 (2014).
82. This is why Citizens United has inspired many corporate law scholars to call for
better disclosures or other reforms that would protect shareholder interest or better align
the law with practice. See, e.g., Strine & Walter, supra note 3, at 363–79; Lucian A.
Bebchuck & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 83 (2010); Tucker, supra note 3. And indeed the alarm was raised some time ago
with respect to the First Amendment, corporate speech, and shareholder protection. See
Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981).
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is exceedingly difficult for shareholders to even propose fairly
basic issues like the terms of executive compensation.
83
These are the “procedures of corporate democracy” that
the Citizens United Court thought would suffice as an answer to
the objection that corporate managers are using other people’s
money for their own political speech when they direct the
corporation to spend money on political or issue advertising.
Corporations aren’t democracies governed by one person, one
vote. They may not even reflect one share, one vote since there
84
may be categories of stock which have preferred voting status.
Apart from the procedures of “shareholder democracy,”
shareholders’ other remedy, if management is spending money on
speech with which shareholders disagree, is exit, which means,
selling their shares. But in today’s environment that remedy is
more theoretical than real. “[T]he practical realities of stock
market ownership have changed in ways that deprive most
85
stockholders of both their right to voice and their right to exit.”
“Most Americans have become ‘forced capitalists’ who must give
over a large portion of their wealth to the stock market to fund
86
their retirements and their children’s educations.”
Thus, protecting the corporation’s speech hardly seems to
protect the rights of the shareholders behind the corporation.
Who else might the corporation represent? From the perspective
of who actually makes the decisions, the better candidates might
be the managers, directors, and executives. Yet they too are
awkward choices from a corporate governance perspective.
Legally, managers are agents of the corporation not its
principals. As agents they have a duty of loyalty to the corporation
which should guide any decision-making about what speech to
fund. “Under conservative corporate theory, the only legitimate
reason for a for-profit corporation to make political expenditures
83. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010).
84. “[I]n some corporations one or more classes of common stock is non-voting and
in many corporations preferred stock has limited voting rights.” BAUMAN, supra note 73,
at 204.
85. Strine & Walter, supra note 3, at 370 (noting that most Americans are compelled
to invest through retirement funds which have many limitations on exit and which provide
limited information on the precise holdings). See also Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not
United: The Lack of Shareholder Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 53 (2009), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/pdf/823-pa5w1bp2pdf.
86. Strine & Walter, supra note 3, at 370. See also Leo Strine, Jr., Breaking the
Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts on a
Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079 (2008).
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will be to elect or defeat candidates based on their support for
policies that the corporation believes will product the most
87
profits.” In no sense then can the corporation’s speech be said to
reflect that of its managers or directors, unless by good fortune
they coincide.
Managers are bound by law, at least in theory, to advance the
corporation’s interests, not their own. So it would be awkward, to
say the least, to characterize the corporation as a vehicle for their
self-expression. That might be what is actually happening, but if
so, it is precisely the sort of self-dealing which much of corporate
law is concerned with preventing. It hardly seems to offer an
attractive argument to say that managers of a corporation have a
constitutional right to express themselves with the corporation’s
money.
And as previously noted, lower level “employees” certainly
cannot be the “real people” whose interests are vindicated if we
protect corporate speech because they in no way control the
corporation’s exercise of the corporation’s constitutional rights,
whether of speech or religion. Indeed, in Hobby Lobby, the
corporation’s rights were displacing employees’ rights under the
statute. And for all of the grand rhetoric about interest in freedom
of speech, corporations are notoriously less protective of their
88
employees’ freedom of speech than they are of their own.
In short, none of the real persons Shapiro and McCarthy
describe seem to be good candidates for the rights-bearing
individuals whose rights are being recognized when the Court
protects the corporation’s right.
D. LISTENERS’ INTERESTS
The fourth gambit is to rest protection for corporate speakers
on the rights of listeners. Corporate speech like that of Citizens
United, or any corporate speaker, is protected, so the argument
goes, not so much because the corporation itself is a protected
speaker, but because such speech may contain valuable
information for listeners. “By suppressing the speech of manifold
corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government
prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and
advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their

87.
88.

Strine & Walter, supra note 3, at 383.
See, e.g., Fischl, supra note 67.

WHY PERSONHOOD MATTERS_FINAL DRAFT II (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

WHY PERSONHOOD MATTERS

6/26/2015 3:00 PM

379

interests.” 89 The idea is that it is in the public interest to offer
broad protection to speech to ensure that “the marketplace of
90
91
ideas” is enriched by all ideas.
But the marketplace of ideas argument is a particularly weak
one in this context. In a sense, attempting to justify corporate
speech rights by virtue of listeners’ interests seems to be a
concession that the argument in favor of a right residing in the
corporate speaker is not terribly compelling (or perhaps nonexistent). And, although this rationale enjoys a distinguished
pedigree in First Amendment jurisprudence, the principle it
appears to state, that an open “marketplace of ideas” will produce
92
the truth, is clearly wrong—at least unless we take such a long
view that we might question whether that fact is of use to anyone.
There are all sorts of reasons to expect that there will be
market failures in the speech “marketplace” just as there are in
93
the economic one, market failures that suggest that if your goal
is increasing information and protecting the rights of listeners, the
marketplace of ideas justification will not get you very far.
All sorts of bad ideas are “accepted” by the public and it is
94
by no means certain that the best ideas will “win” in the long run.
Horoscopes are very popular. Yet we should not deduce from that
fact that astrological predictions are sound. The marketplace of
ideas proposition—that protecting one person’s speech benefits
us all because it increases the chances that the good ideas will win

89. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010).
90. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas:
Commercial Speech and the Problem that Won’t Go Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 181 (2007)
(discussing the “marketplace of ideas” trope).
91. It is not clear that there is a similar “marketplace of ideas” justification for the
exercise of religion; that is, free exercise doesn’t seem to be protected because a
multiplicity of religions is a per se good or produces the most truth. Rather, it seems to me
to be more straightforwardly connected to the protection of the individual conscience, a
feature which makes application to a corporation especially awkward.
92. The classic expression of this is Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market”).
93. See Piety, supra note 90.
94. For excellent argument on why the market cannot be expected to reliably
maximize truth, see Alvin I. Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market
for Ideas, 2 LEGAL THEORY 1 (1996).
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out 95—reflects the fallacy of composition, i.e. that what is good for
96
one member of a unit is good for all of them together.
This reliance on the listeners’ interest is particularly
unhelpful in resolving situations where it does not appear that
hearing the speech is in the listeners’ interest, such as when the
listeners assert that they do not want to hear it or where speech
97
causes some harm. Post-Citizens United, the asymmetry of
resources to produce speech almost guarantee market failures. As
Chief Justice Strine and Nicholas Walter observe,
Conservative corporate theory [ ] accepts the fundamental
economic reality that rational economic actors have an
incentive to keep as much of the profits of their activity for
themselves as they can while seeking to shift the costs of their
economic activity to others if possible. The ‘tragedy of the
commons’ is the academic label often used to illustrate this
phenomenon, and the real world tragedy of pervasive
environmental wreckage caused by capitalist behavior in the
98
nineteenth and twentieth centuries is evidence of this reality.

The response to this problem, Strine and Walter write, has
been “to have the legitimate instruments of the people’s will,
reflective of their desire, set the boundaries for corporate conduct
99
by regulating the externality risk in the public interest.”
But the ability of government to regulate business will be
undermined in an environment where so much of the support for

95. Or, more to the point, what is good for General Motors is good for all. See Martin
H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech
and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (1998).
96. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 816–17 (1935) (citing RALPH M. EATON, GENERAL LOGIC 340
(1931)) (noting that unfair competition law creates wealth by allowing the first user of a
term to exclude others).
97. Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (arguing that interpreters of the First Amendment too often
did not give enough weight to the harm done by racist speech and that traditional civil
libertarian approaches to free speech conflict with other constitutional guarantees). It is
depressing to contemplate that we have not made much more progress on this front, but
rather have added new categories of and platforms for hate speech at the same time as
some of the world’s most powerful entities have gained protection for their speech by
expropriating the language of the civil rights movement. Professor Owen Fiss long ago
pointed out that vigorous protection of speech could end up chilling speech and that free
speech jurisprudence had taken a libertarian turn that may give insufficient weight to other
interests. See OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996).
98. Strine & Walter, supra note 3, at 380–81.
99. Id. at 381.
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political campaigns comes from those who would be the targets of
regulation.
Almost by definition, this [corporate political participation
along the lines authorized by conservative corporate theory]
will increase the danger of externality risk, because corporate
expenditures will be made with the singular objective of
stockholder profit in mind, and therefore will be likely to favor
policies that leave the corporation with the profits from their
operations, while shifting the costs of those operations
100
(including excessive risk taking or safety shortcuts) to others.

Put another way, the structure and incentives of a for-profit
corporation suggest that corporate political speech is likely to
101
harm the public, not benefit it. Tolerating this harm in fidelity
to some abstract notion of listener benefit seems unwarranted.
II. CORPORATE PERSONHOOD MATTERS BECAUSE
A. MIND THE GAP
A good deal of the argument for why focusing on personhood
matters is captured in the above rejoinders to the arguments that
it doesn’t matter and that we should stop talking about
personhood. However, there are some affirmative arguments in
favor of focusing on personhood.
In the first place, declining the invitation to skip over the
personhood question puts the focus back where it should be: on
asking the Court for a justification for giving corporations,
particularly business corporations, constitutional or statutory
rights previously believed to be the preserve of human beings.
The closest anyone has come (in my view) to offering a
justification for conferring constitutional rights on corporations is
the argument, discussed above, that protecting the corporation
protects the rights of the human beings in the corporation.
But as we have seen, that justification is unsatisfactory.
Trying to explain corporate rights by virtue of “the people”
connected with the corporation simply begs the question: “Which
people?” So far, the Court has not supplied a clear answer.
Ultimately, the “look to the people” argument is muddled and
unpersuasive.
100.
101.

Id. at 383.
A good deal of commercial speech would fall into this category.
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What might be more helpful is to focus on what sort of entity
the corporation is and what function it is meant to perform. By
this I do not mean the sort of “transcendental nonsense” that
102
would attempt to investigate its “essence.” Rather, I mean
asking whether we are dealing with what political scientist David
Ciepley calls “incorporations of people” or “incorporations of
103
property.”
Early corporations were almost entirely of the first type.
Indeed, “[e]verywhere . . . corporations were considered agencies
of the government . . . for the furtherance of community
104
purposes.” For example, Ciepley writes, “[m]ost medieval
corporations were incorporations of people, including towns,
105
monasteries, cathedral chapters, universities, and guilds.” These
sorts of corporations are a species of political organization, not
what comes to mind when we use the word “corporation” today.
And they differ in significant ways from corporations formed
solely to conduct a business.
The idea that organizations of people, whether in the
corporate form, or in some other form, (i.e. trust, partnership,
etc.) ought to be subject to different rules depending on their
purpose is a very old one. For example, a 1949 article dealing with
the power of unincorporated groups to own property, by Richard
Powell, in the Columbia Law Review, observed:
Group activity has been a constant ingredient in human life
from its earliest known days. The recognition of group rights
and duties with respect to things regarded as valuable has been
an inescapable consequence. . . The extent of legal recognition
of capacity does and should differ according to the nature of the
group in question. When a group activity (a) serves a desirable
social end and (b) is facilitated by the possession of land rights,
the recognition of capacity of such group to acquire, to hold
and to transfer interests in land becomes socially requisite. As
either of these factors shades down, the necessity diminishes.
102. See Meyer, The Real Error, supra note 20 at 2182–86.
103. “Corporations may be usefully divided into two broad types: incorporations of
people-and-property and incorporations of property alone.” David Ciepley, Is the U.S.
Government a Corporation? The Corporate Genesis of Modern Constitutionalism 13
(unpublished draft on file with author). He refers to the former as “incorporations of
people” for shorthand. Id. Ciepley argues in this paper that the U.S. Constitution may have
“corporate roots,” by which he means to allude to these early examples of incorporations
of people, not to suggest that the United States is like a business..
104. Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM.
& MARY L.Q. 51, 55 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Ciepley, supra note 103, at 13.
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Hence it is to be expected that the law will differentiate between
unincorporated associations on many bases, treating differently
those existing for the economic profit of the constituents and
those functioning for the promotion of religious, fraternal, social
106
and more transient objectives.

Such differentiation is precisely what Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby reject.
The article goes on to note that courts have tended to defer
to an organization’s internal rules and practices regarding
procedures for self-governance and authority when determining
ownership and authority to transfer property when dealing with
107
institutions like churches, while with respect to unincorporated
businesses like trusts or partnerships court tend to look to the
108
documents.
The fact that even unincorporated groups have been deemed
109
able to hold and transfer land suggests that “personhood” is not
a critical element to that power. And Powell’s observation that
the legal treatment of such groups differed depending on whether
the court was dealing with a church, fraternal organization or a
business, suggests that the Supreme Court’s current stance, that
distinctions between not-for-profit and for-profit corporations or
between human beings and corporations are somehow
discriminatory is of recent vintage.
Similarly, it is difficult to make an originalist case for this
treatment of corporations since corporate law has changed so
significantly. In the eighteenth century global conglomerates were
unknown. Corporations could not own other corporations. They
did not have perpetual life, nor so broad a scope for operation as
106. Powell, supra note 57, at 297 (emphasis added). The institutionalist turn in First
Amendment scholarship seems to be a version of this argument. Scholars in this school of
thought argue we should inquire into whether the speaker is a “First Amendment
institution.” See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013). In addition
to Horwitz there are other scholars who have proposed some sort of institutional analysis
in the First Amendment, particularly for the press. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Institutions in
the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L. J. 821 (2008); Frederick Schauer, Principles,
Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998).
107. Id. at 305–08.
108. Id. at 310–19.
109. Powell suggests that this was the majority view (at least by the mid-twentieth
century) when he writes, “Some courts persist in the viewpoint that an unincorporated
group is not an entity and hence that a deed to such a group, in its collective name, is a
nullity.” Id. at 300. The word “persist” seems to indicate that the majority of courts would
recognize, through a variety of paths described in the article, an unincorporated group’s
right to acquire, hold and transfer land, despite the fact that its lack of incorporation meant
it did not have the benefit of corporate personhood.
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“any lawful purpose.” 110 Thus, it is doubtful that any conception
of the corporation from that time can be usefully extrapolated to
this.
What we can say with some confidence is that many of the
Framers expressed deep suspicions and fears of the corrupting
111
potential of great aggregations of wealth. Perhaps we should
consider those expressions a part of Akhil Amar’s “unwritten
112
constitution” and as evidence that the Framers would have
rejected this expansive notion of corporate personhood?
In any event, the rule announced by Citizens United seems to
expand the dangers of the abuse of power from great aggregations
of wealth. And it continues in the tradition of the Santa Clara
decision by expanding constitutional guarantees for corporations
without a sustained justification for doing so. Focusing on
personhood might turn a spotlight on that analytical gap and the
degree to which the Court has, thus far, relied on misdirection and
elision and on advancing the claim that rules singling out
corporations for separate treatment constitute improper
113
“identity-based distinctions.” As Justice Stevens observed;
“Like its paeans to unfettered discourse, the Court’s denunciation
of identity-based distinctions may have rhetorical appeal but it
114
obscures reality.” This brings us to the second reason why
personhood matters, words matter.
B. METAPHORS OVER MATTER
Personhood is a powerful metaphor. The idea that all persons
should be treated equally is one of our strongest political
commitments. By employing the equal protection rhetoric and
110. See, e.g., BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS supra note 73 at 159–60 (discussing the
withering away of the ultra vires doctrine in light of the prevalence of general incorporation
statutes which permit broad grants of power).
111. There is, for instance, the famous quote from Thomas Jefferson to the effect that
he hoped “we shall crush in [its] birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which
dare already to challenge our government to a trial of strength and bid defiance to the laws
of our country.” See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 949 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Tom Logan, in THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 42, 44 (P. Ford ed., 1905)). Since the modern corporation did not exist at the
time Jefferson wrote, it is not entirely clear which corporations he had in mind. But it is
fair to say that concern about concentrations of power and wealth, whatever their source,
were of some concern to the Framers given what we know from a variety of sources.
112. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012).
113. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 945 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
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making references to a “disfavored” speaker, the Court invokes
the popular philosophical, political, and moral commitment to the
equality of human beings under the law, particularly with respect
to fundamental rights. The personhood language exploits our
impulse to reject as discriminatory distinctions between human
persons and extends it to distinctions between human beings and
corporations or between different types of corporations. But we
do not have a longstanding philosophical, political or moral
115
commitment to the equal treatment of fictional persons, as such,
without regard to their constituent parts, at least not until
recently.
Metaphors are important. They may have powerful
116
psychological impacts. This insight drives much of politics,
advertising, and public relations—all of which seek to persuade.
Law too is a profession that seeks to persuade (even if it is also
the case that learning to divorce words from their ordinary
meaning sometimes seems like it is an integral part of legal
117
education). And if we are to judge from opinions like Citizens
United, replete as they are with concern about discrimination
against “disfavored” speakers, then it would seem that lawyers
and judges alike are not immune to the rhetorical appeal of
casting the corporation in the role of a person like any other,
protestations to the contrary elsewhere notwithstanding.
Certainly we know that the idea that corporations are people has
galvanized the public more than any other aspect of the Citizens
118
United decision, so much so that it seems like those activists who
are interested in reform should not be quick to dismiss focusing
on it.
It is surely no accident that the personhood or nonpersonhood of a fetus has also been the locus of debate in the
context of abortion and that those who oppose abortion are the
ones who have latched onto the practice of describing the fetus as
a “person” or that several states have passed or attempted to pass
115. “[A]s a matter of fact, the term ‘fiction,’ as applied to a corporate person, was
meant to carry over the notion of a legal fiction, which in Roman law as in English was the
deliberate assumption of the thing which was not, a definite and quite unconcealed makebelieve.” Max Radin, supra note 20, at 643–44 (emphasis added).
116. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980)
(describing metaphors as powerful modes of structuring thought in a manner that is largely
invisible to us).
117. Cohen, supra note 96, at 811 (characterizing lawyers as “trained by long practice
in believing what is impossible”).
118. Greenhouse, supra note 1.
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so-called “personhood amendments” which would severely limit
access to abortion on the grounds that a fertilized egg is a legal
119
person. Calling upon the legal fiction of personhood seems a
deliberate part of the litigating strategy by those like James
120
Bopp who push for expansive rights for corporations and
restrictions on abortion.
It is also probably no accident that courts deciding cases on
behalf of the powerful often cast their actions as a decision to
benefit the less powerful. When the Lochner Court set aside the
New York law regulating bakers’ working hours it did not do so
by focusing on the employer’s liberty to set the working hours for
its employees, but on the baker’s supposed liberty to accept them.
There is no contention that bakers as a class are not the equal
in intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual
occupations, or that they are able to assert their rights and care
for themselves without the protecting arm of the state,
interfering with their independence of judgment and of
121
action.

Framing the ruling as upholding worker dignity undoubtedly
had more appeal for the public than one emphasizing the
employer’s right to demand long hours from its employees.
Indeed, we might judge the personhood metaphor’s power by
the sheer weight of the protestations that it has no role to play in
this new First Amendment jurisprudence. Whether it takes the
122
123
form of soothing reassurances or sneering mockery, the
cumulative effect of these objections is of protesting too much.

119. Michelle Dean, Abortion is Not a Tragedy: An Interview with Katha Pollitt,
GAWKER (Oct. 15, 2014, 1:20 PM), http://review.gawker.com/abortion-is-not-a-tragedyan- interview-with-katha-poll-1646628315 (discussing KATHA POLLITT, PRO:
RECLAIMING ABORTION RIGHTS (2015)). See also Bryan A. Garner, The Power of
Naming, 101 A.B.A. J. 24 (2015).
120. See Viveca Novak, Citizen Bopp, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Jan. 2, 2012),
http://prospect.org/article/citizen-bopp (describing James Bopp, Jr.’s work for Citizens
United and other clients pushing for expansive First Amendment rights as well as
restrictions on abortion).
121. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). Whether New York’s law was
inspired by a desire to keep recent immigrants willing to work long hours out of bakeries
or to improve working conditions is apparently a matter of some dispute. But what we
know of the working conditions at the time, a period which included the notorious Triangle
Shirtwaist Company fire and from which the term “sweat shop” originates, doesn’t offer
much reassurance about the working conditions which the Court frames as freely chosen.
122. Posner, supra note 6.
123. Bainbridge, supra note 6.
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All this rhetorical legerdemain has extremely serious
consequences. This new corporate antidiscrimination approach
threatens the government’s regulatory powers generally. “[T]he
124
debate can be over once the labels are assigned.” If all
regulation that treats marketing or business related speech
differently than political speech is “discriminatory” and
subjecting a business organization to different rules than a nonbusiness organization is likewise discriminatory, then a good deal
125
of the existing regulatory regime is unconstitutional. This upsets
much of the power of the government to regulate in the public
interest. This claim is not mere speculation. Cases making just
126
such arguments are bubbling up in the lower courts.
Ronald Reagan is often credited with launching a broadly
deregulatory agenda in his presidency, what became known as the
“Reagan Revolution.” It heralded a sea change in the regulatory
environment. Although there may not have been an absolute
diminution of the number of regulations, there was a significant
change in the approach from the Executive Branch. This period is
generally credited with initiating a move toward deregulation.
This movement was controversial in part because administrative
agencies are not directly responsive to the electorate. And the
operation of regulatory agencies is, by and large, not the sort of
thing which makes for gripping political narrative. There are a
thousand ways in which an executive, bent on undermining the
purpose of a law, can uphold its letter while gutting the spirit. This
is particularly true if that executive has the help of some members
127
of Congress and lobbyists.

124. Garner, supra note 119, at 24.
125. This development is not one limited to the United States. Columbia political
science professor Turkuler Isiksel writes:
The arrogation of human rights discourse by transnational business corporations
is significant not simply because it recalibrates their status under international
law, particularly in relation to states. It also has the potential to destabilize the
moral and political force of human rights by diverting their focus from the
protection of urgent human interests towards protecting the commercial interests
of large firms. Although it is tempting to dismiss as preposterous the attribution of
human rights to corporations, the settled practice of recognizing corporations as
legal persons and bearers of rights in many domestic legal systems suggests that
the issue is more complex.
Isiksel, supra note 60, at 9–10 (emphasis added).
126. See supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Haley Sweetland Edwards, He Who Makes the Rules, WASH. MONTHLY
(Mar./Apr. 2013),
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_2013/
features/he_who_makes_the_rules043315.php?page=all.
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But if we are concerned about accountability, the Court is the
128
least accountable branch. We might call the Roberts Court’s
corporate civil rights jurisprudence the “Roberts Revolution.”
129
Not since Lochner, when the Court used freedom of contract to
strike down regulation, has there been such a sweeping challenge
to the other branches of government. It remains to be seen
whether, in the long run, like Lochner, the Court will end by
reversing its course. In the meantime, before that happens, if it
happens, a lot of damage may be done. It may be done
incrementally, case by case, but it may be damage nonetheless,
not only in cases lost, but in regulatory efforts not undertaken or
130
not enforced for fear of running afoul of the First Amendment.
131
A lot can happen in a decade or so.
CONCLUSION
Corporate personhood is a legal fiction. It, like the
corporation itself, is a useful tool. But we should not lose sight of
the fact that it is merely a tool. “Law exists for [human beings] to
express their relations and subserve their needs. One of these
needs is to [speak] of collectivities as though they too were
132
persons. But an equal need is not to forget that they are not.”
The most successful business entities have a powerful impact
on the political process. They exert powerful influence over
society as well. The largest organizations are multinational and
128. Yale law professor Alexander Bickel famously designated the Court as the “least
dangerous branch.” ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). The events of the last few years might
call that into question.
129. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
130. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Impending Collision Between First Amendment
Protection for Commercial Speech and the Public Health: The Case of Tobacco Control, 29
J.L. & POL. 599, 601 n.7 & 8 (2012) (describing the pessimism of some tobacco control
advocates that tobacco regulations would survive constitutional scrutiny).
131. Consider the tobacco companies’ success in postponing widespread awareness of
the health consequences of smoking cost hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives. A
number of books have been written detailing the industry’s effort to avoid regulation,
create doubt about health risks, etc. See, e.g., ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE
CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT
DEFINED AMERICA (2007) (cigarettes were one of the century’s most heavily promoted
products); RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA’S HUNDRED-YEAR
CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP
MORRIS (1996) (same); ROBERT PROCTOR, GOLDEN HOLOCAUST: ORIGINS OF THE
CIGARETTE CATASTROPHE AND THE CASE FOR ABOLITION (2011) (tobacco related
deaths are still close to the equivalent of two jumbo jets crashing every day).
132. Radin, supra note 20, at 665 (emphasis added).
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exert pressure on social policy on a global scale, helping to write
treaties and other international accords, creating and
administering legal and quasi-legal systems of adjudication for
their interests and disputes, influencing legislation world-wide in
a search for a set of rules most congenial to the conduct of their
businesses.
In such an environment it does not seem alarmist to suggest
that in order for governments to be able to maintain control over
business such that its negative externalities can be minimized and
that social policy can take account of what is in the best interest
of all its citizens, not merely what is most congenial for business,
the government must be able to rein in private power through
appropriate regulation. Undermining the government’s power to
133
regulate in this way is a troubling development. It may allow
“the authoritarian incorporation of property—to declare its
independence from the state under the flag of the private and
134
gradually hijack the state that had sponsored and protected it.”
The twenty-first century is still young, but, fifteen years in, it
appears we are experiencing a reprise of the struggles of the
beginning of the last century and the end of the nineteenth. That
135
is, we seem to be experiencing a new Gilded Age. No doubt
there are real differences between then and now, but the
similarities are nevertheless striking. Then, as now, many people
were concerned that industry exerted too much influence over
136
government and society as a whole; then, as now, income and

133. Economist Thomas Piketty has argued that wealth inequality is growing and is a
predictable outgrowth of unregulated capitalism. His cure involves greater governmental
intervention, primarily in the form of taxes. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2013). The emergent equal protection for
corporations and commercial speech arguments represent a substantial impediment to the
likelihood of adopting such a remedy.
134. Ciepley, supra note 103, at 50.
135. “It has become a commonplace to say that we are living in a second Gilded
Age . . . .” Paul Krugman, Why We’re in a New Gilded Age, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 8,
2014, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/may/08/thomas-piketty-new-gildedage/ (reviewing THOMAS PIKKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2013)).
136. Howard Fineman, A New Gilded Age Threatens the State of Our Union,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 9:38 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/01/23/gilded-age-state-of-the-union_n_4647348.html (comparing the Koch
brothers to railroad magnates of the nineteenth century). See also Susan B. Glasser, The
New Gilded Age, POLITICO (July/Aug. 2014), http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2014/06/editors-note-108020_full.html. (“[T]here’s no doubt that the
troubling nexus of money and power is a lot of what this year’s elections are about at a
time of spiraling inequality, massive, unaccountable political spending and a Washington
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wealth inequality contributed to political unrest and instability. 137
Then the country was struggling to reconcile industrialization with
American democracy. Today it may be that the struggle is to
reconcile capitalism (at least in its contemporary American form)
138
with American democracy.

that increasingly seems dysfunctional by design.”); Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate
Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L & POL’Y REV. 1 (2008).
137. Fineman, supra note 136; Glasser, supra note 136. See also LARRY M. BARTELS,
UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2008).
138. The enormous success of Thomas Piketty’s book and the discussions it has
generated suggest that this struggle is by no means confined to the United States. See, e.g.,
Stephanie Flanders, Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty – Review, THE
GUARDIAN (July 17, 2014, 2:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/jul/17/
capital-twenty-first-century-thomas-piketty-review. But since this Essay deals with U.S.
law, the extent to which this may be a global phenomenon will not be addressed.

